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CAPITAL RISK, CONSUMPTION and PORTFOLIO CHOICE
This paper is concerned with the interaction of
saving and portfolio decisions of a single consumer.
Its building blocks are the classical theory of optimal
allocation over time, and Arrow's recent formulation of
the theory of portfolio selection. The concept of a
risk aversion function is extended to a two-period
context, and the implications of declining risk
aversion are explored. Also discussed are the problems
of the effect of changes in the rates of return and in
the degree of risk, as well as the question of taxation
and risk-taking.
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l. Introduction
In the classical analysis of saving, derived from
the work of Irving Fisher [5], it is assumed that what-
ever amount the consumer wishes to save out of current
income, is invested at an exogeneously given rate of
interest. This rate of interest is most naturally inter-
preted as a certain rate of return; there is no capital
risk in this model. One might, of course, offer the
interpretation that the analysis may also be applicable
to a world of uncertainty, in which asset yields are not
perfectly known, but this escape is not very satisfactory.
For in the real world of uncertain asset yields the con-
sumer typically has a choice between several assets when
composing a savings portfolio, and casual observation is
sufficient to conclude that the resulting portfolio will
generally be a diversified one. This line of reasoning
suggests that the theory of consumer saving should drop
its one-asset assumption, and take account of the insights
offered by the modern theory of portfolio selection. The
argument works the other way too. Portfolio theory is
concerned with the optimal composition of a portfolio of
given size. It would seem a promising undertaking to try
to work out a theory in which the size and the compo-
sition of the portfolio are simultaneously determined.
Capital risk is, of course, not the only kind of
risk which is relevant to the consumer's saving-con-
sumption decision, although the present paper concen-
trates on this type. No attention is paid here to the
fact that future income may also be imperfectly known,
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nor do we take account of lifetime uncertainty, which
has been discussed in a recent paper by Yaari [12].1)
Sections 2 and 3 of this paper summarize briefly
the main characteristics of Fisher's theory of saving,
and Arrow's version ~f the theory of portfolio selection.
In section 4 an integrated model of saving and portfolio
choice is presented, and necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a local maximum are derived. The concepts
of risk premium and risk aversion function are de-
veloped in section 5. Section 6 is concerned with the
question of whether the risky asset is a normal good.
Section 7 analyzes changes in asset yields, and section
8 is concerned with the effect of a capital gains tax
on saving and risk-taking. The effect of increased
riskiness on present consumption and saving is explored
in section 9. Finally, some concluding remarks are
collected in section 10.
l) There is not much published work in this field.
Phelps [8J has analyzed consumption allocation over
time with capital risk, but there is no portfolio
choice in his model. Hakansson [6] has, however,
extended Phelps' model to include choice among alterna-
tive inve::;;tmentopportunlties. Both of these authors
analyze special forms of additive utility functions
with discounting of an instantaneous utility function.
More in the sp:Lrit of the present paper are unpublished
work by Diamond [3] and by Dr~ze and Modigliani [4].
These authors formulate a two-period model similar to
the one used here, and they do not assume additivity
of the utility function.
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2. Fisher's Theory of Saving
The consumer is assumed to have a preference ordering
over present consumption, Cl' and "future" consumption,
C2 2) This ordering is such that it can be represented
by a continuous ordinal utility function
Present and future income (Yl,Y2) are assumed to be
exogeneously given. It is also assumed that the consumer
has access to a perfect capital market, in which he can
borrow and lend at the same rate of interest, r. The
budget constraint is then
The necessary condition for a constrained maximum is
(l) Ul - (l + r)u2 = O
or
which is Fisher's famous rule for optimization over time;
equality between the marginal rate of time preference and
the rate of interest:
The effect of a change in income (say Yl) on present
consumption can be written as
2) See [11] for some comments on the legitimacy of the
two-period framework.
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(2 )
(l + r)u22 - U12= (l + r) D
where
2D = Ull - 2(1 + r)U12 + (l + r) U22 < O
as a second-order maximum condition. From this it is
easy to see that necessary and sufficient conditions for
the marginal propensity to consume to lie between zero
and unity (which is equivalent to the requirement that
both Cl and C2 be superior goods) are3)
(l + r)u22 - U12 < O,
Ull - (l + r)U12 < o.
The interest rate derivative of present consumption is
(3)
BCl Yl - Cl
5r = l + r
Ur>c..+ -D
with the substitution effect always negative and the income
effect positive for a lender, negative for a borrower
(assuming that Cl is not inferior).
3. The Theory of Portfolio Selection
The theory of portfolio selection has recently re-
ceived a very elegant and general treatment by Arrow [1,2].
3) These are local conditions, assuming that ul/u2 = (l+r).In general, the condition for absence of inferiorlty is that
ul/u2 is decreasing in Cl and increasing in C2. This
implies
and
II .
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The individual agent ("investor") has a utility-of-
wealth function W(Z), where Z refers to final wealth,
i.e. wealth at the end of the period for which the in-
vestment decision is binding. Marginal utility is every-
where positive and decreasing. Z is defined as
Z = a(l + x) + mel + r),
where a and m are the amounts invested in the risky
and the secure asset, respectively. r is the rate of
return on the secure asset, and x is the random rate
of return on the risky asset with subjective density
function fex). The budget constraint is
A = a + m,
A being initial wealth. Final wealth can now be ex-
pressed as
Z = A(l + r) + a(x - r).
The investor maximizes expected utility
E[WeZ)] = J W(Ael+r) + aex-r)) f(x)dx
in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. The first-order maximum
condition can be wri~ten as
(4) E[W'(Z)(x-r)] = 0,
while the satisfaction of the second-order condition is
guaranteed by the assumption of concavity. (4·) says, in
effect, that expected marginal utility per dollar invested
should be equal for the two assets.
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Arrow4) has introduced the concepts of absolute and
relative risk aversion. These measures are defined as
vr"(Z)
= - W ' (Z) ,
respectively. Note that both measures are positive
(under risk aversion) and invariant under positive linear
transformations of the utility function.
Arrow advances the hypotheses that RA(Z) is a de-
creasing function of Z and that RR(Z) is an increasing
function of Z. Decreasing RA(Z) implies that "the
willingness to engage in small bets of fixed size in-
creases with wealth, in the sense that the odds demanded
diminish", while increasing RR(Z) may be interpreted
to mean that " • of"l.L both wealth and the size of the bet are
increased in the sarne proportion, the willingness to ac-
cept the bet (as measured by the odds demanded) should
decrease".5)
The derivative of risky asset holdings with respect
to initial wealth is
(5) 5a5A =
E[W"(Z)(x-r)]
E[W"(Z)(x_r)2] .
4) The exposition in this section leans heavily on that
of Arrow [2, pp. 32-44]. The measures of risk aversion
used by Arrow were independently developed by J.W.Pratt
[10] •
5) The quotations are from Arrow [2, pp. 35-36].
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The denominator of this expression is clearly nega-
tive, so that the sign of the derivative is the same as
that of the numerator. It can be shown that decreasing
absolute risk aversion implies E[W"(Z)(x-r)] > O, sa
that the risky asset is a normal good. The proof of
this closely resembles those presented in section 5 of the
present paper, and will not be given here.
The attractiveness of Arrow's approach - deducing
empirically significant conclusions from plausible hypo-
theses on behaviour in simple risk situations - makes it
seem a promising undertaking to reexamine his conclusions
within an integrated model of saving and portfolio choice.
This is a task to which we will turn in the next section.
One further comment: Arrow assumes that there
exists a secure asset, in the sense that its rate of
return is known wjth certainty. The existence cf such
an asset, either subjectively or in some objective sense,
may be questioned on grounds of realism, although in eco-
nomies characterized by a high degree of price predicta-
bility, government bonds or bank deposits might come close
to this ideal. But the basic defence of the assumption
is an analytical one; we wish to study the choice between
assets which are relatively secure and assets which are
relatively riSky, and this is one way to do it. Another
approach is to assume that the probability distribution
of the yields can be completely described by means of
first and second moments, but that approach is more re-
strictive.
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supposed to be a subset of the interval [-l, 00).
Combining the last two expressions, we obtain
=
Substituting this into the utility function, we have that
expected utility is
(7 ) E [ II ] = J U ( Cl' Y2 -'- (y l - C l ) (1+r) + a. ( x- r )) f (x )dx ,
where integration is over the range of x.
Maximization of (7) leads to the first-order conditions
(9) = o.
Equation (S) j_sa generalization of Fisher's rule:
as formulated in (1) above.
Equation (9) is the counterpart of the first-order
condition for the pure portfolio model, equation (4), except
that the marginal utility of income has been replaced by
the marginal utility of future consumption.7)
7) This does not meal':. that "wealtn" or "income" in the
pure p0rtf~lio model is simply a proxy for future
consumption. Traditional portfolio theory can most
naturally be interpreted as being concerned with
timeless risk prospects, which means that the un-
certainty will be removed before the saving-consumption
decision is made. In this paper we are concerned with
temporal risk prospects. This means that the un-
certainty about the yield of the risky asset is not
going to be removed until the end of the first period.
The distinction between timeless and temporal risks
has been stressed by Dr~ze and Modigliani [4].
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4. A General Model of Portfolio Choice and
Allocation over Time
We shall study a consumer whose preferences conform
to the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for rational choice
under uncertainty. His preference ordering on consumption
profiles can be reDresented by a continuous cardinal utilit:
function
(6) u =
which is assumed to be at least three times continuously
differentiable, and to possess every~here positive marginal
utilities.
The budget constraint is expressed by the equation
which says that inco~e in the first period can be used t8
buy consumot t cn goods (for consumption in the same nerjod:- - ,
or to invest in the risky asset (a) or the secure asset (m
Future consumption is a stochastic variable and is defined
as
y2 + a ( l +x ) + m( l +I' ) ,
where l' and x are to be interpreted as in the previous
section. is takeri to be a real m-rnbe r greater than
minus one, and the range of the random variable x is
6) ri]1P mode I i-iD.S no exrI t c i t :::rs?ttrr-;cr.t (jf rrtc83, tJecC-lJ.s'
they are of no particular interest for the nroblems
discussed in this paper. But it is clear that all th,
variables Cl' C2, a and m could have peen writtenas products of price and quantity components. For
general equilibrium analysis this approach is , of
course, essential.
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The second-order conditions for the local maximum
are
(Il)
(12) 2E[(x-r) u22] < O.
This model can now be subjected to comparative statics
analysis in the Hicks-Samuelson tradition. Without further
assumptions the conclusions that can be drawn are analogous
to those of traditional demand analysis in its most general
form. Thus, no a priori conclusions can be drawn as to
the signs of the income derivatives, except, of course,
that their sum must equal unity.8) As for substitution
effects (compensated changes in yield), direct substitution
effects are positive, while the signs of the cross substi-
tution effects are indeterminate. An increase in the yield
~f the secure asset will raise the demand for that asset,
wh ILe the demand for the risky asset will increase with a
shift in the probability distribution of its yield which
increases the mean with no change in dispersion. Nothing
can be said about the effect on consumption of compensated
8) One may feel that it would be legitimate to assume that
present and future consu~ption are normal goods. One
might then ask whether this has any implications for
the income derivatives of asset holdings. The answer
is no, apart from the obvious fact that their sum must
be positive. It would still be possible for one of the
assets to be inferior.
14
changes in yield, while in the Fisher model this is always
negative. The difference is explained by the fact that
hl I F' h' l' ta t t ti d ti s ~W e lS er s ana_ysls COn"aInS wo goo s , ours ~s a
three-good model, where the signs of cross-substitution
effects are indeterminate. It is then perfectly possible
for yield changes to influence only the composition of
the portfolio while leaving consumption unchanged, even
when attention is restricted to substitution effects.9)
5. The Risk Aversion Function
Pratt [10, pp. 124-125] shows that the function
_WI!(Z )/v!' (Z) (in the symbols of section 3) may be taken
as a measure of local risk aversion for timeless risks.
For infinitesimal risks he shows that the risk premium,
which is defined as the actuarial value of a gamble
minus its cash equivalent, will be proportional to this
function, which Arrow [2] calls absolute risk aversion.
The appealing hypothesis that the risk premium is less,
the greater is the wealth of the investor, is then seen
to imply that absolute risk aversion is a decreasing
function of wea ltho We shall now develop the concepts
of risk premium and risk aversion in a temporal context.
Underlying this development is the basic viewpoint of
this paper that saving involves giving up the certainty
of present consurption for the uncertainty of future con-
sumption.
9) We shall generallyassume that assets are held in non-
zero (although not necessarily non-negative) quantities.
From (9) it is easy to see that the condition for a=O
is E[x) = r, or, if negative holdings of the risky
asset are not allowed, E[x] ~ r.
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Consider a consumer who, for a given level of Cl'
is offered the opportunity of entering into a fair gamble,
where the outcomes are C0-h with equal proba-~
bility. h is taken to be a very small number, so that
this gamble is, in Pratt's words, an infinitesimal risk.
The expected utility of this gamble is
The utility of the expected outcome of the gamble is,
of course,
which, under risk aversion (in the sense that U22 < O),
is greater than the expected utility of the gamble itself.
Let the positive risk premium, p, be defined by the
equation
Multiplying by 2 and subtracting 2U(Cl,C2) on both
sides, we get
The ~xpression in braces is approximately equal to
-PU2(Cl,C2). Dividing thrbugh by h on both sides, we
have, as an approximation,
Dividing once more by h, we get, again as an
approximation
- 16
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·and
(13) 2h2 P
U22(C1,C2)
= - U2(Cl,C2)
The right side is then approximately "twice the risk
premium per unit of variance for infj_nitesimal risks"
(Pratt's formulation) for the type of gamble where present
consumption is given, and the outcomes are given in terms
of quantities of future consumption.
The important thing to notice about the risk aversion
function (13) is that, in general, it depends on both Cl
and Cn• If an additive utility function is assumed, the
c
risk aversion function depends on C2 only. In that
case, as shown in an earlier paper [11], the generalization
of Arrow's results becomes very simple and direct.
However, there does not seem to be any compelling reason
for assuming additivity. Indeed, recent work by Pollak
[9] seems to show that this implies quite strong re-
strictions on the preference ordering ofthe consumer.
We shall assume that the risk premium, and therefore
the risk aversion function, is a decreasing function of
C2. This seems an intuitively reasonable assumption, and
one which suggests itself naturally from consideration of
the additive case. The question of how the risk premium
depends on Cl seems far more complicated, and particular
hypotheses do not suggest themselves so easily. However,
we shall assume that the risk premium is increasing in Cl.
This means that the higher is present consumption, the
higher is the consumer's risk premium for gambles on future
consumption. It is tempting to call this risk complementarity,
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and its opposite (risk premium decreasing in Cl)
risk substitutability. But- it should be noted that this
involves no assumption on the sign of U12, which is the. 10 )classical measure of complementarlty.
We shall now prove two mathematical lemmas, which
will be of importance for comparative statics analysis.
Lemma l:
5 {-
U22 E[ (x-r)u22]5C2
-} < O implies > OU2 = =
if a > O, and
E[(x-r)U22] < O if a < O.=
Proof: From section 4 above we have that
Define
c o =
2
Since C2 = C2
0 + a(x-r) and -U22/U2 is decreasing
in C2, we have
(14) if x > r and a > O,
where the right-hand side is the risk aversion function
oevaluated at C2 .
10) Risk complementarity, as defined here, may be seen as
implying,roughly, decreasing risk aversion at the beginning
of the second period. The higher is consumption today, the
lower are the resources at disposal at time 2, and the higher
is risk aversion.
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Trivially
(15) -u (x-r) < O2 if x > r.
Mul tiply through in (1)+) by -U2 (x-r).
The inequality is then reversed.
(16) if x > r and a > O.
Suppose noV! that x (r. Then inequalities (14) and
(15) are both reversed, and so (16) holds for all x.
Since (U22/U2 f is not a random variable, we can take
expectations on both sides of (16) to get
E[ (x-r)U22] if a > O.
But the right side is zero because of (9). Hence the
lemma is proved for a > O.
Suppose now that a < O (short sales of the risky
asset). This will reverse inequality (14) and therefore
(16) as well. Again taking expectations, we have that
if a ( O,
where the right-hand side is zero. This proves the
lemma for a ( O.
Lemma 2:
B U{- 22} > O implies E [(x-r )U12 ] < OBel U2 = =
if a > O and E[(x-r)u12 ] > O if a < O.= =
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Proof: Writing out the derivative in full, we obtain
5 {-
U22 U122U2 - U22U12-} = U 2BCl U2 2
But we have also that
,
so that we may as well base our proof on -U12/U2
being increasing in C2.
Adopting the notation of the previous proof
(17) > if x ~ r and a > O.
Multiplying through by -qfx-r) we have from (15)
and (17)
(x-r)U12 <
U
(U12)O ( ). U2 x-r2
if a > O.
This actually holds for all x,
(15) and (17) are both reversed if
expectations, it follows that
since inequalities
x < r. Taking
if a > O,
because
If a ~ O, inequality (17) is reversed. It is then
easy to see that
E[(x-r)u12] ~ O if a < O.
This completes the proof of the lemma~
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Corollary:
From lemmas l og 2 it follows immediately that
E[ (x-r)U - (l+r) (x-l")U22] < O if a > O12
and that
E[ (x-r)U - (l+r) (x-r )U22] > O if a < O.12 ::::: :::::
6. The Non-Inferiority of Riskv Assets
Arrow [2] proves that" decreasing absolute risk
aversion implies that the risky asset is not an inferior
good. We are now in a position to prove a similar theorem.
We shall first make the assumption that both present
consumption and saving are normal goods, i.e that the
marginal propensity to consume lies between zero and one.
Since we have that
+ E[(x-r)u12 - (1+r)(x-r)U22] E[(1+r)(x-r)U22]}
it is easy to see that a necessary condition for BCl/BYI11)to be positive is that
(18) E[(1+r)u22 - U12] < O.
Moreover, since the marginal propensity to save,
l-BCl/BYl, can be written as
Il) From lemmas l and 2 the last term in braces is negative.
Since E[(x-r)2U22] is negative, (18) follows.
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it follows that a necessary condition for 5S/BYI > O
is that12)
The income derivative of risky assets is
(20 ) Ba lBY
I
= - H{E[Ull-(1+r)u12] E[(1+r)(x-r)u22]
+ E[(1+r)U22-u12] E[(1+r)(x-r)u12]}·
The sign of this derivative is ambiguous both for
a > O and a < O. The reason is that when higher= =
income increases both present consumption and planned
future consumption (saving), the increase in future
consumption decreases risk aversion while the increase
in present consumption increases risk aversion. The
ambiguity of this result as compared with Arrow's is
not to be deplored. It is true that as a general propo-
sition the hypothesis that the risky asset is a normal
good seems preferable to its opposite. But an inter-
temporal apalysis should keep open the possibility that
a consumer experiencing an increase in income should
thereby become less willing to gamble on the level of
future consumption.
12) From the tV/o lemmas the last term in braces is
posi tive. So (19) is necessary fur the whole
expression in braces to be positive.
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If one makes the strong assumption of additivity,
the expression (20) is very much simplified. With de-
creasing marginal utility of present consumption, de-
creasing absolute aversion is a sufficient condition for
the risky asset to be a normal good.
We shall not go into the question of the effect of
increases in income on relative portfolio shares. This
has been discussed elsewhere [Il] for the case of an addi-
tive utility function. In that case Arrow's conclusion
that the income elasticity of the securg asset is at least
one must be weakened to the effect that the income elastici-
ty of the secure asset is at least as great as that of the
risky asset. This is allan the assumr.tton of increasing
relative risk aversion, indeDendent of present consumption.
With the present approach, even this result would be hard
to upho Id vIithout addi tional assumpt t ons ,
7. Changes in Yield
We first examine the effect of an additive shift in
the distribution of 'che random variable x. Thus, let
the yield on the risky asset be x+Q, where Q is the
shift parameter, and tlifferentiate with respect to Q.
This may be interpreted to mean an increase in the ex-
pected value of the yield with all other moments constant.
The result is (when the derivative is evaluated at 9=0)
- 23 -
which is a Slutsky equation. The second term on the right
is the substitution effect, which is positive. Let us
assume that aa/oYl > O for a > O and aa/aYl < O for
"a < O, which might perhaps be taken to be the normal
ca:e13). Then the income and substitution effects work
in the same direction. If a ~ O, an increase in the
expected yield will always increase invest~ent in the
risky asset. If a ~ O, the interpretation is that an
increase in the expected yield will always reduce the
debt held in units of the risky asset. An example may
perhaps make this clearer: With an uncertain future
price level an increase in the expected rate of price de-
flation will increase investments held in constant nomi-
nal value and decrease debt issued in constant nominal value.
The effect on consumption is
(22) = al+r
BC .
5Y~ + ~ E[U2]E[ (x-r)UI2-(I+r)(x-r)u22J·
The income effect is positive for a > O and
negative for a < O. From the corollary in section 5
it follows directly that the substitution effect is nega-
tive for a > O and positive for a < O. It follows
that the sign of the total effect is indeterminate in both
cases.
It may be of interest to ask what would be the effect
of a general rise in yields, i.e. of an increase in the
rate of interest on the secure asset together with an
13) That aa/aYI < O for a < O means that the con-
surner will increase the amount of debt held in the
risky asset.
- 24
additive shift in the probability distribution of x.
This can be answered by differentiating with respect to
r and setting BG/or = l.
(23)
Here the sign of the income effect is positive or
negative, according as Yl - Cl ~ ° and the substitution
effect is negative, independent of the behaviour of the
risk aversion function. It is natural to interpret this
as a direct generalization of the analysis of interest
rate changes under certainty (compare equation (8) above).
What would be the effect on asset holdings of such
a general rise in yields? There will, of course, be income
effects, but of more interest are the substitution effects.
The effect on risky asset holdings is
(Ba) __
Br BG/Br=l
with the substitution effect positive for a ~ 0, and
negative for a < O. Thus, with a general rise in yields,
the substitution effect indicates that the risky asset will
generally be substituted for the secure one. In the case
where the consumer takes a short Dosition in the risky
asset, the general rise in expected yields will cause him
to decrease his borrowing in that asset14).
14) To arrive at the total effect, account must,of course,
be taken of the income effect. To work out all possible
cases would be very tedious and is left to the inter-
ested reader. The most interesting case may be
a ~ 0, Yl-Cl> O, aa/oYl> 0, in which aa/år is
positive.
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8. Capital Gains Taxation and Risk-Taking
A problem which has been studied by several authors
is the following one: Suppose that an individual can in-
vest in two assets, one bearing a secure rate of return of
zero, and one risky asset with random yield x. Suppose
a proportional tax is levied on investment income with
full loss offset provisions. How does this affect the
composition of the portfolio? The most modern and general
treatment of this problem is that of Mossin [7], who shows
that the tax rate derivative of risky asset holdings,
5a/5t, is simply equal to a/(l-t).
A question raised by Mossin's analysis is whether
his conclusion depends in any essential way on the as-
sumption of a fixed portfolio. In other words, one may
ask whether reac tions of saving to tax rate changes rmgh t
not corne ~o dominate the simple reaction pattern implied
by his model.
We shall try to answer this question in terms of
the analysis of this paper. Future consumption is
The first-order condition for a maximum of E[U(Cl,C2)]
are
E[Ul-U2] = 0,
E[U2X] = O.
Differentiating with respect to t, we obtain
- 26 - '
(24) Ba5t =
a
l-t '
(25) = o.
Consumption is unchanged when the tax rate increases,
while the reaction of the demand for the risky asset is
"-, th di t - b •.~ . , o ]exac LoJ_Y 1 e ane pre ac eCl y nossi n s moae -. The rationale
of this result is simply that it implies that expected
ut t Llty , E[U(Cl, Yl+Y2-Cl +ax(l-t))] remains constant
when the tax rate is increased. Constancy of expected
utility is clearly the best that the consumer can hope
for. When given the opportunity, he should behave so as
to achieve just that.
The somewhat surprising simplicity of these results
does not carryover to the case where r is not zero.
However, as long as the tax is levied on the differential
yield (x-r), the results are exactly as before. This
case may not be entirely unrealistic. It could be taken
to represent a tax on "excess profits". Or, if m is
tal{en to be a debt instrument issued to finance the holding
of the risky asset, it would simply represent deductible
interest payments on debt.
9. Variations in the Degree of Risk
The "degree of risk" is an elusive concept when not
measured by one statistic as e.g. the variance. Following
a suggestion by Arrow (l], we shall analyze the problem
by means of shift parameters, paying special attention to
- 27 -
the effect on present consumption and saving.
We note first that the probability distribution
on which expected utility depends, is that of the differ-
ential yield, x_rI5). A pure increase in di3persion can
now be studied by means of (l) - a multiplicative shift
around zero, and (2) - an additive shift to restore the
mean to its initial value. In combination, this means a
multiplicative shift around the mean. The effect of a
multiplicative shift around zero was examined in section 8
as a change in t, and was shown to have no effect on con-
sumption. The effect of an additive shift was studied in
section 7 and expressed in equation (22). Two cases need
to be considered.
(l) a > O. In this case we have 16)E[x-r] ~ O ,and
therefore a multiplicative shift around zero will
increase the mean. It will, therefore, have to
be followed by an additive shift in the negative
direction for the mean to be restored. For lenders,
therefore, an increase in dispersion has the same
effect on consumption as a decrease in the expected
yield on the risky asset.
= Now we know that E[x-r]. ~ O, and it follows(2 ) a < O.
that a multiplicative shift around zero will decrease
the mean. The mean has, therefore, to be restored by
means of an additive shift in the positive direction.
We conclude that for borrowers, ah increase in dis-
15) Developing the expression for expected utility in a
Taylor series, it is easy to see that it depends on
the successive moments of x-ro
16) Compare footnote 10 above.
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persian has the same effect on consumption as an in-
,crease in the expected yield on the risky asset,
which in this case serves as a debt instrument.
This connection between the effects of changes in
expected yield and in its riskiness ties in nicely with
the more intuitive view that the effect of uncertainty is
to make the "true" interest rates higher than their expected
values17) .
Equation (22) implies that the effect on consumption
of an increase in expected yield on the risky +- •asse", lS
indeterminate for all a; there are always the con -
flieting tendencies of the substitution and income effects.
A fortiori, this will also be the case for increases in
risk.
10. Concludin~ Remarks
While the model of this paper may be seen as a
generalization and extension of Fisher's theory of saving,
it would be somewhat unfair ta its founder not to note
that it is very much in the spirit of his analysis. It.
was Fisher who first stressed the need for simultaneous
analysis of saving and investment decisions, and he was
well aware of the problems raised by uncertainty, although
he did not attempt any formal study of these problems.
17) Dreze and Modigliani [4J have arrived at the same
result by a different sort of analysis.
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We conclude with a few observations on the generality
of the results. Increased generality can be achieved in
a number of ways, and we shall cOr.'mentupon tHO of them
only. The first is an extension to more than two periods;
.the second is to allow for an arbitrary number of risky
assets.
To pass judgement on the restrictiveness of the two-
period model it is necessary to be quite clear about the
kinds of questions one wants to ask. If one's sole inter-
est is in deriving the implications for present decisions
of intertemporaI allocation under uncertainty, then the
two-period assumption would seem to be adequate. On the
other hand, if one is interested in the sequential nature
of decision-making, a ~ultiperiod approach becomes es-
sential. The concern of the present paper is, of course,
with the former type of problem.
Several of the results of this paper hold for the
case of an arbitrary number of risl-::yassets. However,
this does not apply without reservations to the results
based on the particular hypotheses about the risk aversion
function, since these do not seem to carryover to the
case with more than one risky asset, or, equivalently, to
the case where risky assets are not held in constant pro-
portions independent of income. Thus, for instance, with-
out any specific assumptions about the risk aversion
function it would still be true that the effect of in-
creased uncertainty is the same as that of a decrease
in expected yield on the ~isky asset. But it would no
longer be possible to determine the signs of the substi-
tution and income effects involved.
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THE EFFECT of UNCERTAINTY on SAVING DECISIONS
Two types of uncertainty concerning the future
are examined in this paper; uncertainty with re-
gard to future income and uncertainty as to the
rate of return on capital investment. Assuming
the existence of risk aversion and decreasing
temporal risk aversion (a concept which is defined
in the paper) it is proved that increased riskiness
of future income will increase saving, while in the
case of capital risk the substitution effect calls
for less saving and the income effect for more.
The analysis is briefly related to empirical studies
of the consumption function.
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l. Introduction
HoVl does increased uncertainty about the future
affect the consumer's choice between saving and immediate
consumption? This question has received considerable
attention in the ljterature, although not often of a
formal character. Thus, t,lfr~d f'Iarsholl[11, p. ?26J
wrote:
"The thriftlessness of early times VIas in great
measure due to the want of security that those who
made provision for the future would enjoy it: only
tho SC~ \'11-1') 1/Jer"p E1_J._reD.i :,'·;.:;0.1 tnv ~.\:'8~ee strorlg eno')_g~!-l
denv i ng nea,sant wr.o had hea'Godne) C', little store of
hand, was a constant warning to hjs i)Y" 2. to
-<-he" c ou.ld"'-'"' J ~.) .~', •
At first glance these two statements may seem incon-
sistent. But closer inspection reveals that Marshall and
BauIding do not really discuss the saGe kind of uncertainty.
futu~e nen-capital incore, ~arshall analyzes the effect
'I'he role of
saving ~n the two cases is fundamentally fifferent. In
savings is that of a buffer providing a
future consumption will not fall below some minimum level.
In other words, accumulated savings is the certain com-
ponent of total resources available for future consumption.
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In the Marshallian case of capital risk, however, the
more one saves, the more one stands to lose. Giving up
a dollar's worth of certain present consumption does not
result in a certain increase in future consumption. It
is by no means obvious that these two types of uncertainty
affect saving decisions in the same manner so that it may
still be POSSible to ~econcile the statements of MarShall
and BauIding, both of which appear to have considerable
intuitive appeal.
There are not many examples of formal treatments of
savrng c~ocisiors under unc er t.a i rrt y , 'IlLe appr-oach adopted
!n the present paper is similar to that of Dr~ze and
Modigliani [4], Diamond [3] and Leland [lOJ, all of whom
work within a two-period framework without assu~ir~ addi-
tivity of the utility function. Additive utility functions
are assured by Phelps [13], Hakansson [9] and Mirrlees [12J,
who work with n-period or infinite-horizon models. As long
as one is not interested in analyzing sequential decisions,
the two-period model would seem to be adequate, while it
has also the advantage of not requiring the assumption of
additivityl).
l) The present paper may be seen as a companion piece
to [15], which is chiefly concerned with the inte-
gration of models of saving and of portfolio choice.
2. The Risk Aversion Function
Important contributions to the theory of cholae
under uncertainty have recently been made by Arrow [l]
and Pratt [14J, who have introduced the concept of a
r i s« aversion function. P.rroV!and Pratt are concerned
with preferences over probability d~stributions of fjnal
wealth only, expr-e ss.cd :in t.er-ms of a concave utili ty
function W(Z), where Z is final wealth. If the risk
premium is defined as the actuarial value of an uncertain
prospect rm nu s t t s C!er':~.a::_ntyequivalent, j_tC8..n be shown
_l,f!l r,7' /1.;' (,Z \
lo, \ __ _J){~. ~!J'
el they ought to pay less fer
[III y\ 11")7,1T, ~_,. -c./_,. ~e shall now develon a risk aversion function
spects the ou~comes ~f
decision been rrade, and present a temporal version of
"7 )
tl-- e hypo the s i s n.co de cr-eae i ,'c' ",-j ~l.r aun,.." Sl' on '.1 ""Y:) ""~. J_ ,lj_ v 0_'-.'0 .!. ~0,c v,-,_ •
The consumer is assumed to have a preference ordering
OVG"r crc' s errt and +'11"-""''',' {'?J-nCl1r"nt-' on t c f" "Jh~ eh c an be, .''. ,,- J_y,l .• ,u'_· ,,' ""U_','~ ~'_ll '''1'''2) ,' ..L ' •• ~"i •
represented by a continuous, cardinal utility function,
(l) u
2) We shall not here be concerned with the relative risk
aversion function, wh i ch is defined as _~;!H (Z )zhJ' (Z).
3) The first part of the following analysis parallels
that of [15].
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which is further assumed to possess continuous derivatives
of first, second and third order with first-order deriva-
t· h l t I 4)Ives everyw_ere POSI lve .
Suppose now that a consumer is offered a gamble with
vectors of present and future consumption as outcomes.
Let there be two possible outcomes, (Cl,C2~h) and (CI,C2+h)
occuring with equal probabili .,». The expected utili.ty
of the gamble is then
while the utility of the expected outcome is
U(C"C,.,).
..L c..
Let the risk premium~ p, be defined by the equation
f'.1ultiplyingby 2 and subtracting 2U(C
I
,C2) on both
sides of this expression, we obtain
2{U(CI,C2-P)-U(CI,C2)} = U(CI,C2+h) - U(CI,C2) + U(CI,C2-h)
- U(CI,C2)·
Here the expression in braces is approximately equal to
-PUj Cl'C2). Ille now divide by h on both sides to obtain
as an approximation,
4) Derivatives of U
thus OU/OCI = Ul'
will be denoted by subscripts;
52U/5C15C2 = Ul2 etc.
5) h is taken to be a small number, so that this gamble
conforms to Pratt's definition of an infinitesimal risk.
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Once more dividing by h, we get, again as an approxi-
mation,
and
(2) =
U22(Cl,C2)
U2(CI,C2)
var-Lar.c e for infini t esLmal rjslcs. In oX'dsr to have risk
(0 > O) ~e Gust ~equirc that U22 ( O.
that it is a fULcticn of two var~~bles, so that there is ~o
r::'sl;
e~ersion. In [15' it has been sucses~o~ that the risk
aversi~~ function is decreasing in and increasing in
C,; this hypothesis was shown to lead to sensible results .
.1_
We now observe that this implies knowledge of the behaviour
of the risk aversion function for cP00site movements in Cl
and
from any Doint c in the indifference ~ap, the risk aversion
I'unct to n decreases w L th mov ernerrt s in the Hl/i direction arid
increases with movements In the SE djrection. ~e shall
(Jecrec,s iI:_r:
It should be stressed that this hypothesis about the
risk aversion function is a restriction on the utility
function and should be interpreted solely in terms of
- 37 -
Fig. l
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properties of the preference ordering, independently of
the budget constraint of the particular problem discussed
here. The interpretation is as follows: Suppose a con-
surner Il, Il L. ' s:owns a consump~lon veccor and is
offered a gamble where the two possible outcomes are
-h and h of future consumntlon. He is asked to give
the odds on which he . " ,VJ1..LJ_ accept the gamble. UncleI'risk'
aversion we know that the odds 1;;111 be "better than fair";
thus, if v(h) is the probability of a gain of h, we
know that the consumer will demand v(h) > ~ in order to
acce~t the r~mble. It is ~easonRble to aSSLme that ~(h)
as cl nat.ur-a l e~':.t.7:1;s j_ <> n
Will be 1owsr, the hi
Likewise, it seems attractiv0 to assure that 'iJ:Lll
be higher, the hi er lev l of nresent
• for~icrl it follows
that v(h) will fall with a simultaneous lrc~ease in C"
c:
':.aneousdecrease in
s Lrnu l >
6) An alternative interpretation of the hypothesis, which
will emerge from the discuss~on below, is the following:
For any consumntion vector {C1,C2} we ray cornDute itsex -e cted ',~re2e(,',:;value as
lC,+ ( l·:..r)-.l C,",.
.L c:
If C~ is increaSed and C, is decreased so as to hold
the p~esent value constant,Lthe risk aversion function
w iL'l de c r-e a s e . Tt-le lj~l~'()t}-"~esi;:_:: CJf de,crec~"s.i_1-~g ter.po r-a I
r-i Sle [.~ ve r-s j_ OB ir:"("' l i es t.h.. t ~-('lj. S ril i II l:e tr-ue f'o r a Ll.
values of r. Following this interpret&tion, the hypothe-
sis right alterne,tiveLy have been denote d "decreasing
risk aversion along a budget line".
Leland's hypothesis [10] is that the risk aversion
function decreases w i th movements to the Ii'd along an
indifference curve. In the neighbourhood of the opti-
mum these measures will be approximately the same.
Indead, Leland relies on a Taylor expansion to establish
his result.
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So much for interpretation. The hypothesis of de-
creasing temporal risk aversion can now be written as
U2') 5 U20 5 U22(3) d {- _Sl = {- _c.c} (-dCI) + {- u} dC2 / o.BCI 5C2 "U2 U2 2
Without loss of generality we may write
= (l+r) dCI,
where (l+r) is so~e nonnegative real number. (3) can
then be wri~ten as
d U"'2 5 U 5 U,.,,",°2( J~ ) {- ---S.::.} = - {- ~} + (l+r) {- ~1 ( Ode, U2 SCI U2 BC,., U
,
oL c: 2
for all values of (l+r) ~ o.
We now observe that under our continuity assumption
the following holds as an identity.
The inequality in (4) can now be written as
(5)
5 . U12 - (l+r) U22~ { U } < O.
2 2
This result will prove helpful in the following discussion
of the effects of uncertainty.
It is easy to see that if the utility function is
additive, the risk aversion function will depend on C2
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only, and the assumption that risk aversion is a decreasing
function of C2 is then sufficient to establish the re-
sults derived in the following sections.
3. Income Risk
In this section we shall discuss the effects of in-
creased riskiness of future income on present consumption.
(6) =
where Yl is income in the first period, assumed to be
known with certainty, and Sl is saving. Futur-e con-
sumption is given by
(7 )
where r is the rate of interest, which is assumed to be
known in this case of pure income risk, and Y2 is future
income, which is not known in period l. The consumer's
beliefs about the value of future income can be summarized
in a subjective probability density function f(Y2) with
mean ;; on the basis of this the consumer maximizes
expected utility in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
Combining (6) and (7) we can write
(8 ) =
Expected utility can the be written as
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where integration is over the range of Y2' Maximizing
with respect to Cl' we obtain the first-order condition
(9) O,
and the second-order condition
2D = E[U11 - 2(1+r) Ul2 + (l~r) U22] ( O.
The effect of an increase in income (Yl) can be
found by implicit differentiation in (9):
The sign of this derivative cannot be determined
a priori, but in the following we shall assume that it is
always positive, both under certainty and uncertainty,
which implies that
(10 ) U12 - (l+r) U22 > O,
We now wish to examine the effect on present con-
sumption of an increase in the degree of risk concerning
future income. This raises the problem of how to measure
the "degree of risk" without adopting the rather restrictive
mean-variance approach. One solution to this problem, used
by Leland [10], is to expand (9) around (Yl'~); one then
obtains an expression contaihing the variance of Y2.
Here we shall take a more direct approach.
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One can examine two kinds of shift in the probability
distribution of Y20 One is an additive shift, which is
equivalent to an increase in the mean with all other moments
constant. The other is a multiplicative shift, by which
the distribution is "stretched" around zero.7) A pure in-
crease in dispersion can be defined as a stretching of the
distribution c.rollnda constant r1ean. This is equivalent
to a combination of additive and multiplicative parameter
changes.
Let us write future income as
(11) YY2 + 9,
the expected value of which is
Here y is the multiplicative shift parameter, and
9 is the additive one. Because of the nonnegativity of
Y2 a multiplicative shift around zero will increase the
mean. It must, therefore, be counteracted by an additive
shift in the negative direction, so that the expected value
is held constant. Taking the differential, the requirement
is that
which implies that
7) Since Y2 is most naturally interpreted as a non-
negative number, the distribution will really be
stretched only on the right side of zero.
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dG
d'Y = =
We can now substitute (11) into the first-order
condition (9) and differentiate with respect to 'Y.
We then obtain
BCl
(5y)5G =
5'Y
(12)
It can be shown that decreasing temporal risk
aversion is a sufficient condition for this derivative
to be negative, so that increased uncertainty about future
income decreases consumption (increases saving).
Proof: :ile rir-st def:Lne
8) A numerical illustration is perhaps in order at this
point. Let there be
y l Y 2 Mean Variance2 2
10 20 15 25
Il
12 24 18 36
9 21 15 36
l
t 1 v 1. 2wo possib e values of future income, -2 and Y2 '
occuring with equ~l probabi~ity. Initially we have
Y21 = 10 and Y22 = 20 with mean and variance as .
given in the first line of the table. fl!ultiplying Y2l
by 1.2 increases the variance, but it also increases
the mean, as shown in the second line. We can now re-
store the meaD to its original value by subtracting 3
from each Y2l in the second line. By a combination
of a positive multiplicative shift and a negative
additive shift, we have obtained an increase in.the
variance with the mean constant.
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From (8) we have that
=
Because (U12-(1+r)U22)/U2 is decreasing in C2, we must
have that
U12-(1+r)u,,) LI_ ,~- ( l +r )U r- '"(13) L.c_. ;' { le: C'c' } if Y2 > ~ .U2 = U2 ~ =
The right side of this inequality is evaluated at Cn = e0c c;_
and is rot a randnm variable.
Obviously
(14)
1;le nov! rul'c_~r:_lY on bo+~h sides of (13) by UT (V _!;,r. ..J.... r--. ':> I •
c' e:
Tde then obtain
Taking expected values on both sides we have that
(15 )
We now observe that if Y2 ~~, inequalities (13)
and (14) will both be reversed, so that (15) holds for
all Y2.
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To prove that the left side of (15) is negative, it
is sufficient to show that the right side is negative.9)
From (10) the expression in braces is positive, so that we
have to show that E[U2(Y2-e)] ~ O. Since U22 < O, we
must have
(16)
Trivially,
(17)
(v -~) we can write-2 '-:t
This holds for all Y2, since inequalities (16) and (17)
are both reversed if Y2 ~~. Taking expectations, we
obtain
which implies
Therefore, since
(12) is negative.
D < O, it follows that the derivative
10)Q.E.D.
9) At this )oint it is clear that the proof is one of
sufficiency, not necessity.
10) It may be of interest to record that in the case of
the quadratic utility function klCl+k2C2+k12ClC2+
2 2kllCl +k22C2 present consumption is independent of
the variance of future income. This function can easi-
ly be shown to display increasing temporal risk aversion.
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Our analysis thus confirms Boulding's conjecture
that increased uncertainty about future income leads to
more saving. It is tempting at this point to relate the
result to empirical studies of saving behaviour, but this
will be reserved for the final section of the paper.
4. Capital Risk
'ile no vi tur-n t.oa ,:::,tyJ L~ed vcr-ston of l':arshall's
It laborious and self-deny 1xg :;easar,tl!.In the fj_rst period
he can allocate his resources (Yl) between present con-
sumption (Cl) and capital :Investment (K):
In general, capital investment is transformed into
resources available for future consunption by means of a
transformation function wher-e x is a stochastic
parameter. We shall assume that the transformation function
is of the following simple form:
C2 = K(l+x), l+x > 0,
with x as the random rate of return on capital. x may
conceivably take on the value -l, in which case one may
suppose that the peasant 'S Heal t.h is Il taken from him by a
stronger hand!l; this represents the lower bound on the
range of x.
Combining these two equations, we have that
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=
Expected utility is then
where g(x) is the sub~ective density function of x
and integration is over the range of x.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum
of E[U] are
(ln) == 0,
To examine the effect of a pure increase in risk,
we proceed exactly as in the preceding section. Writing
the yield on capi tal as 'YX+G, vte find that for a mul ti-
plicative shift around zero to keep the mean constant, we
must have
dE[ryx+G] = 0,
i.e.
where
dQ _.
d'Y
Il
._ E[x] .
Differentiating (18) with respect to 'Y and
evaluating the derivative at ('Y = l, G = O) we obtain
(20)
- ~·8 -
Here the first term is the income effect and the
second term is the substitution effect, i.e. the second
term is the value of the derivative with E[U] constant.
It can be shown that the existence of risk aversion
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the substi-
tution effect ~o be posit~ve. The ad.dition"llassuffi"8tion--------_._---~---
of decreasing temporal risk aversion is sufficient for the
income effect to be negative. Il) The total effect cannot be
determined without additional assumptions.
Proof: The oraefs of these assertions are very
similar to the proof that the derj.vative (12) is negative,
as presented in section 3. Consequently, He shall only
sketch the proofs, the details of ~hich will be evident
from the previous one.
Define
so that
= C o + K(x-I-l).2
It is now straightforward to prove that E[U2(X-I-l)] ~ o .
.This is done by writing down inequalities similar to (16)
and (17) and taking. into account that U22 < O. The substi-
tution effect is, therefore, positive. Under decreasing
temporal risk aversion we must have that
11) It is also assumed, for the latter result, that
present consumption is a normal good.
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if x > IJ..
Multiplying by U2(x-IJ.) on both sides, and taking expec-
tations, it is easy to see that, for all x,
U -(l+x)U,.,
E[(U -(l+x)U )(x-IJ)] < {12 U 2c} E[U2(x-11)J.12 22 e- 2 IJ. t""
The factor in braces is a constant, because it is evalu-
ated at IJ.,and it is positive because of the non-
inferiority of present consumption. But E[U2(x-IJ.)] has
been shown to be negative. Hence
=
0,
and the income effect is accordingly positive.
The intuitive interpretation of the result is fairly
simple. An increase in the degree of risk makes the con-
sumer less inclined to expose his resources to the possi-
bility of loss; hence the positive substitution effect
on consumption. On the other hand, higher riskiness makes
it necessary to save more in order to protect oneself
against ve_ry low levels of future consumption. This ex-
plains the negative income effect on consumption.
How does all this.tie in with Marshall's hypothesis?
Presurrably we should judge him to be correct on his own
terms. His statement that increased capital risk will in-
crease present consumption may be seen as amounting to
neglect of the income effect, which is what Marshall gener-
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ally practiced in his analysis of demand. (See e.g.
Friedman's interpretation in [7].) However, a more
complete analysis must take account of the income effect,
so that it is no longer possible to arrive at any clear
conclusion in the general case.
('I ...:l .... l tn +- '1-' • t ..v ' -11'lJome r-eactor-smay reer .nac "ne DOJ.n 01 i"arsna.. s
simple story has been pressed too far. The analysis of
the present section is a study of technological uncertainty,
in which the rate of return on capital is a continuously
distributed random variable. In contrast, Marshall may be
is ert.her- sorce »osit.tve nun.oe r- x w i t.h rrobabiltty p and
-l with probability ~-p. In that case our interpretation
of the income effect may Lot ~ake much sense. Whatever the
correct interpretation - and this paper is not chiefly COD-
cerned with what i'::2.rshallrea1ly meant - ther-e j s sufficient
similarity between his case and ourn ta consider his comments
as being concerned with the effect of capital risk in general.
In analyzing the effect of capital risk it is sometimes
desirable to allow for asset choice, so that the consumer
may react to change in riskiness by a reallocation among
assets. A model along these lines has been studied in [15J.
However, the present analysis is not necessarily a step
backward. The one-asset model may be of considerable rele-
vance for many real-world problems, since many types of
increases in riskiness will apply to the yield on all assets,
so that the possibility of hedging against risk"by port-
folio rearrangements are limited. Moreover, for society
as a whole, real capital constitutes the only form that
saving can take (at least in a closed economy); the present
model may, therefore, be seen as a simplified analysis of
optimal growth under uncertainty.
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5. Empirical Aspects of the Analysis
In this section we shall comment on some broader
implications of the theory presented above. In recent
years there has been a great deal of work done on recon-
ciling observed saving behaviour with theories based on
utility maximization over time. However, most of the
theoretical work12) has been incomplete in taking no
account of the uncertainty of future income and/or the
rate of return on savings.
income hypothesis [8] is his distinction between nermanent
and transitory income changes and his hypothesis that the
propensity to consume is lower for transitory than for
permanent changes in income. This hypothesis can in fact
be derived from utility analYSis.l3) Assuming that the
consumer maximizes U(Cl,C2) subject to C2 = Y2+(YI-Cl)·
(l+r), and provided that there is no uncertainty, the
consumption demand function can be written as
= f(V,r), O < f (l,v
where
v =
12) Leland [10] has an interesting discussion of the
empirical implications of his analysis.
13) The interpretation of this hypothesis has been the
subject of some disagreement in the literature.
Rather than f'oLl.ow the "extreme" view of Friedman,
I chose to adopt the position of Eisner [5].
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V is the lifetime income of the consumer. The main point
of Friedman's argument is that changes in current income
influence consumption only through their effect on life-
time income.
The response of consumption to a permanent change in
income is
=
and to a transitory change it is
(ec. L
l '_
Hence the marginal pronensities to consurre are, respectively,
l-l--v>
.L ' .L
= f (1-1-v'
,
j___ o
and it is obvious that (del/dYl) > (del/dY, )~.p -'- -I- IJ
If we assume dYn/dY, = l, the former propensity would
c: J_
be approximately twice the latter for small r; for a
three-period model, which Friedrran considers to be reason-
14)able, it would be approximately three times as large.
If now data from time series show the marginal propensity
to consume to be of tho or-do r of 0.9, it
(del/dYl) ,- p
seems natural
t~ see this as an estimate of and to adopt
l=- . O.q
n - as the the~retical ~rediction of
when r is small and the horizon is not too long.
14) See Eisner's paper ([5], p. 974n.) for an elaboration
of this interpretation.
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What is left out here is, of course, that while a
change in present income is a hard fact to the individual
consumer, the associated change in future consumption is
only a belief not beld with certainty. If higher present
income is associated not only with an increase in expected
future income but also in its riskiness, this will tend
to bring (ec /(1'1 )d l '~l t c Lo se r... to each
other than predicted by the certainty model, because in-
creased riskiness in itself will tend to decrease con-
sumption. While it may be hard to say, in general, whether
high incomes are more or less risky than lowones, this
cons';(ierat'jon ShOll:~d be t·Jh~::l :;nto acc oun.t ','i1.en t.est tng
t.he Fr-ie'.~r·~o ]:;"c..' e "Tn +-1.'~S:s '" ,.r' c' ~',r _'-.,' ",1 dat a IS).~i _,_ QL(';'L,-.wl~)n r DJeO'JI1C.J. c~Sc.lln'_lC 0"".)1.1.1e"".•. V,v.
If one does accept the hypothesis that riskiness of
• . t- J.'-' ~. l . ... . '"' ti, . . n ".Income lS greavesc lor nlg~ 1.DCOmeS, ana 11 Dlgn relers
to a comparison with the average level of income in any
time period, then we have an alternative explanation of
the disereoancy between time series and cross-section
t' t'uno t t 16) A 11' .consump lon l e Ions. s a Incomes Increase over
15) There is, however, some evidence for the hypothesis
that riskiness of income increases with income in a
cross-section material. Eisner ([sJ,p. 976) reports
that the variance of income for "salaried professionals,
officials etc.1! was about twice that of !fclerieal ard
sales wor-ker-s"and 4 to 5 times "Chat of "wage earners"
in American cross-section data for 1950. The evidence
is not conclusive, since variability of cross-section
incomes does not Del" se imply uncertain income ex-
pectations for the individual consumer. However, one
might conjecture that individual'beliefs about future
income are to some extent conditioned by cross~section
income patterns.
16) This has also been pointed out by Leland [lOJ.
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time, with relative income positions approximately constant,
any given level of income will fall relatively to the aver-
age level of income and wlTl , therefore, presumably become
less risky. Because of this we would expect more con-
sumption with a given absolute income the higher is the
general income level.
It has often been observed that there is a significant
difference in saving behaviour between wage and salary
earners on the one hand, and self-employed persons on the
lr! )
other.' Moreover, it is generally accepted that the
incomes than the farner. On the reasonable assumption
that ex Dost variability goes together with ex ante
uncertainty, theoretical considerations should lead us to
expect the self-e~ployed group to save more, and this con-
clusion appears in fact to be supported by empirical research.
However, s-me c&re should be taken in identifying empiri-
cal and theoretical results at this point. As far as
reactions to income uncertainty is concerned, comparison
should be restricted to consumers "'Iith incomes that are
exogeneous, i.e. independent of their own saving behaviour.
As regards self-employed persons, however, their future
income may depend in an essential wayan how much they
save in the present, so that a comparison between these
two groups would rather constitute a test of the effect of
capital uncertainty. But as regards that eff~ct, theory
does not offer any clearcut hypothesis. This is no less
17) For a survey and references see Farrell [6].
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true if the effect of capital risk is studied in a
two-asset model. In that case it has been shown [15]
that the effect of an increase in risk is the same as
that of a fall in the expected rate of return on the
risky assetl8), the sign of which cannot in general be
determined.
18) This conclusion can easily be extended to the
case of an arbitrary number of risky assets.
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EQUILIBRIUiv1 arid EFFICIENCY
in LOAN tvlARKETS
This paper explores the connection between
r;o,npetitJveequi Llbr-Lum and PQ."'et()Ciptimal:i_::yLn et
two-period consumption-loans model. It is shown that
an ordinary loan market achieves only a constrained
Pareto o~timurn, and the I!ature of the constraint is
identified. P,n unconstrained Pareto oot.Lmurn is ob-
tained in a regime of state contingent claims. A
third alternative regime of state contingent rates
of return is also considered.
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l. Introduction
One of the main results of the modern theory of
general equilibrium and welfare economics is that a com-
petitive equilibrium results in a Pareto optimal allocation
'of resources. In a pure exchange system this means that
it is not possible to effect a redistritution of commodi-
ties, which is such that every individual in the economy
prefers the new allocation to the initial competitive one.
'ij
The purpose of this paper is to examine the con-
nection be ts.en n;[.'_rlcc~eQ.1.1:L libri1...l!.:arid ;-2.l'etocpt:::_malit.y
in a two-period consuFDtion leans model, where the future
incomes of consumers are not known with certainty. It is
shown that an ordinary loan market is generally inefficient,
in the sense that the competitive equilibrium is a
constrained Pareto optimum. A full Pareto optimum can
be realized by a system of state contingent claims,
similar to that discussed ""·'T t'.. Y>"VlOT.'1 rL ] 1k.-' J ... ,.;....L ~ - j • It is further
shown that an alternative system of state contingent
rates of return lacks a unique equilibrium; thus, it may
but need not realize the full conditions for a Pareto
opt Lmum ,
The conclusion that state-contingent claims or
commodities are required to reach an unconstrained Pareto
optimum under uncertainty is implicit in the work of Arrow
[l] and Debreu [3J, and it has since been developed in
r ' f4'].different contexts hy Barch L2, Chap. Vllll and Diamond _
In the present paper an attempt i~ made to show explicitly
why it is that a regime which is known to lead to a Pareto
optimum under certainty, fails to do so when uncertainty
is introduced. It also seems to be an advantage to frame
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the discussion in an intertemporal contextl).
In section 2-5 the main results of the paper will
be presented in the form of an example. Generalizations
are provided in section 6, while the final section con-
tains some more general remarks suggested by the analysis.
2. 'rhe Inefficiency of Loan Markets
We consider an econory with two persons. Each of
them OWI1S an income profiJe (Yl'Y2)' and acts so as to
maximize a cardinal util~ty function with consumDt~on in
each of the two ~eriods (c, ,c2) as its arguments.
Their income Drospects are as follows:
Person] has an income of 2 in period l and is
assured of r-ece tv ing the same arr.ounf Ln period 2.
Person 2 will receive an income of l in period l,
while his income in period 2 will be either l or 4,
each with probability
He rr,aythink of each value of person 2's future
income as being derived from a certain !!state of the
world!!; thus, he Hill get l if state Gl occurs, and
4 if G~ occurs. We may summarize this in the following
c:
table:
l) The basic model bears some resemblance to Samuelson's
[5], but it ignores the intergeneration aspects which
~re central in his analysis.
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Person
l
2
2
l
2
l
2
Economic theory tells us that by borrowing and lending,
our two persons would become able to realize more preferred
consumption patterns, and it also tells us that it would be
wise to institutionalize this in the form of a loan market
with a rate 8f return r, which is co~petitlvely es-
1""', \
-t-. 1-\ l ~c,1., '" ,_0c: )
'oJ' ':J..}-v< ..... ...1- .....; 1..1 ~._. <..). •
r: 'I
C) • c O~--;S11~(ip,ti o n IJ2 t t e r-n es-
l
2
c_ c"
fil C- rt":"~
,L C
2-x 2+rx 2+rx
l.LY l-rx 4-rx."
Note that r is interpreted as the gross rate of
return, i.e. as one plus the interest rate on loans.
We assume now that both persons have the same cardi-
nal utility function over consumption profiles:
(l) o(Cl Co-cli 2(6-c,) ,c
o < c0 / 6.c:
2) The two-person assumpt i on is not to be taken literally;
we may conveniently think of them as groups of identi-
cal persons.
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of
For each given r, person l will prefer the value
lx = x, which maximizes his expected utility Ul :
His supply of funds is determined by the condition
dU,~ = - 2 (4+x) + 2 ( It - I'X ) I' = 0,dx
which r~lves
l
It is easy t0 see that person l \\Tj_ 11 be a lender' or
a borr~~or according as >;.'"') / "1.,'; .
Person? wi'] prefer the value of 2 wh i chv.r... ,
maximtzes
U,", - ~·u( l +x , 1- rx )
c:
l~-rx)
We must then have
dU .
dx2 = 2(5-x) - (5+rx)r - (2+rx)r = 0,
which yields the solution
2x 10 - 7r2 .
2(1+r )
VJhether
whether
2x will be positive or negative depends on
< 10
I' > 7.
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i.e.
In equilibrium, supply and demand must be equal,
l 2x = x = x; this condition determines r.
We find easily that the equilibrlu::1rate of return is
6
r = 5 '
which corresrords to an interest rate cf 20 per cent on
loans. The correspondjng value 0f . x is
20cl ~he resulting utility
l e "'le l s ~\j~1~_r -p
TT -- ~~'2.~.',,-)"2 - .
If the r-e had be en no b;:)rrO~lins arid ~_erlding
, 2
(XL _ X = O), the corresponding utility levels would
have heen 40 and 32.5, respectively. Thus, not surprising-
ly, both persons have gained fro~ trade.
Are these gains real ly as large as they could be ?
really a Pareto opti~um; and we shall show that this is
not the case. To see this we have to determine the opti-
mal transfers of income between persons l and 2
Person Cl c2gl g2
l 2-a 2+bl 2+b2
2 l+a l-b' 4-b2l
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We are interested in determining the set of allo-
cations which is such that, given any persons's utility
level, the other person's lJ_tilityis maximized. We can
deternir.e thi s set by max Irrlzing the expression
(2 ) V ::::U + kU2,l k > O.
By letting k vary, we obtain all Pareto optimal
allocations, conversely, to any Pareto optimal allocation
there corresponds a value cf k.
EXDe2te~ utilities a~e
U = lu(2-a, 2~bl)l -I- 1-U(2-8. ~. \ _-,
2 2:::: 72 - (4+a) - -H~-b]_)-
We wish to find the maximum of
This is obtained by solving
~~ ::::-2(1++a) + 2k:(5-a) = 0,
cV 4-b k(5+bl) 0,Bbl ::::
- =I
5V 4-b2 k(2+b2 ) °Bb2 = - = •
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The solution is the following:
5k - 4a k l ,+
(3) bl 4 - 5k== ,k + 1.i,
4 - ?lr
°2
'_.iL
- --_.-lr + 1J:;._
Expected utilities can now be expressed in terms of
k as fallov,rs:
72 - 139.5 ( k:}_,.1r
72 - 139.5 ( l
Elimi nat t k, we obtain an exnressio~ for the
efficiency frontier, which can be written as
(4)
This equation gives the maximuD Dossible utility for
person 2 for any given utility of person l. We now substi-
tute the value for U obtained under the loan market so-l
lution, viz. Ul' == 40.26. This gives U = 33.84 as2
contrasted with 32.76 under the loan market arrangement;
therefore, the market allocation has been shown to be sub-
optimal. The utility enjoyed by person 2 under the loan
market mechanism is not the maximum possible utility, given
the utility of person l.
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3. The Loan Market Allocation as a Constrained
Pareto Optimum
The set of Pareto optimal allocations was derived
above as an unconstrained maximum of the function V in
(l) for any value of· k. Or~ more precisely~ the only
constraint used in deriving the efficient set of allo-
cations, was that the sum of the two persons' consumption
must equal total resources in every period and every state
of the world. In deriving the efficiency locus, a set of
transfer pavments is also determined. For any value nf k,
which are necess to achieve the optimum.
Wo can D0W show that the market aJlocation is a
solution to the constrained ar2~O optinum define~ as
follows:
(5)
subject to the condition
(6) =
Denoting the corr~on value of bl and b2 by b,
we can write our maximum conditions as
6'16a -2(4-+-a) + 2k(S-a) = 0,
~~ 2(4-b) - k(S+b) - k(2+b) = o.
This gives the solution
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5k - 4a = ,l + k
8 - 7kb = 2(1+k:) .
The expected utility levels become
1r 2Ul == 72 - 137 25 (~-\-, _.'. 1+1:1 ,
By eliminating k we can again derive the efficiency
frcnti_e:"as
. ~
(7 ) i ;2 -_ \/ 9;9 ( 72 -Ul) -L Ul - 13:;. 5 .
Setting U_ = 40.26, which was ~erson lIs utility
under the loan mar~et regime, wh i ch
was the corresDonding utility level of ~erson 2.
Visualizin~ the efficiency frontier as a curve, the
efficiency frontier (7) lies below that defined by (4) for
unconstrained Pareto optima. This can be seen directly as
follows. Let Ul = Ul' a constant. Let us denote the
obtained under unconstrained maximizationvalue
Fas U2
of
and the corresponding utility level under constrained
maximization as From (4) and (7)we easily obtain
But because Ul < 72, this expression is necessarily
positive.
Geometrically, the result may be illustrated as in
Fig. 2, where the initial utility level has been chosen
_ 66a _
Constrained Pareto
efficiency frontier
Ur~COf!E;cr-a t r ed Pareto
efficiency frontier
State contingent
.:
claims
so Lu t Lo n
(40'-"7 ~~ '"F7).r" .)).L!
Loan market
so1ution
(40.26, 32.76)
32·5
40.0
Fig. 2
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as the origin. The loan market regime results in an allo-
cation on the constrained efficiency frontier, which is
clearly better than the initial allocation. However,
within the constraints set by the income profiles there
is a set of allocations which is preferred by both con-
sumers, and wh i ch the lOCl;:1rcar-ke t mecharrtsrnis unable to
achievA.
The fundamental reason why the market fails, is that
it is only able to shift resources between time periods
but not between states of the world within periods. In
But the Pare t.o I) LrnaI solution shows t nat j t \'Jillbe to
both cer-scnsI advant.age to effect S11C11 2 transfer of risk.
Person 2 will be willing to forego sorre of his total ex-
pect ed illeoFe JJl erder to rcc;.\)CS the V·'i2iabi lity in his
second-period consumption if he is sufficiently well corrpen-
sated in the ferm of higher expected income. But these
risk preferences cannot be accommodated u~d9r the loan
market regime.
4. State Contin~ent Claims
Since the loan market mechanism is unable to come
up with a Pareto optimal aLl ocati on , i t is natural to look
for other forms of mar-ket.organizat:Lon and evaluate their
performance. One such alternative organization consists
in establishing markets for state contingent claims ;
certificates paying one unit of income if and only if a
specific state of the wor~d occurs. We shall show that
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such a regime is indeed able to achieve an allocation of
consumption which is an unconstrained Pareto optimum.
Let z be the number of o -cert:Lficates (s=1,2)s s
bought by person l and sold by person 2, and let p bes
their respective prices. The consumption patterns will
then look as follows:
Person
1 ~\-!-z')
c.
2 1-z,
"1-'7 )(._._-,'-"2
2
= 72 - (4~D z +n z )"11 -22
Person lIs demand for the two types of certificates
is determined by the conditions
BUl
-2Pl(4+Plzl+P2Z2) (4-z1) O ..= + =5zl
5Ul 2D (lJ + r: r r 'n Z ) (4-z ) O.= + =5z2 - "2 ' ~Jl LJ lT 1-'2 2 2
For person 2 expected utility is
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and the first-order conditions for a maximum are
flU2 2Pl(S-Plzl-P2z2) (5+z1) O,= - =6z1
5U2 2P2(S-Plzl-P2z2) (2+z2) o.= - =5z2
The two set of first-order condi tions gives our two persons'
demand for certificates as functions of their prices .
.Setting demand equal to supply for each certifj_cate, we
nbtajn ~he equ~libriurn ~ricos as
= l /n n__, c:., "'2 =
and the eauilibrium exchange of certificates as
= 36/31.
The final allocation then becomes
Person Cl c291 92
l 54/31 54/31 98/31
2 39/31 39/31 88/31
The resulting utility levels are
Ul = 40.77,
U2 = 33.27.
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This allocation is indeed a solution to the equation (4)
of the unconstrained Pareto efficiency frontier. With
markets for state contingent claims the economy is able
to achieve a full Pareto optimum. Not only is there now
a transfer of resources between periods; there is also
a transfer of risk, whereby person I takes over some of
the variability of rerson 2's income profile.
As the loan market regime results in a constrained
Pareto optimum, it may be useful to consider it as a market
far st2~e contin~ent claims with the tl"13,r}SL~,c.t i cr.s c {JY1St ;.>a.:..~~Lt- -
income of
~"liCD_1.:·2'3 C'0_IJ en iy ~_:p be Il~ .in I~\a,~l"ls. :~',~~1t2 :~~-'2_ce
l 1. r-ef certific~tes is ; ~ - = ;. Thjs gives an
C' 3 r-,
l in the second period with complete certainty.
6Lmt.Lied riskless rate of return is 7:' Drecj ~:;e-
j
of aneLLr
Thus, the
state contingent ciairs then arrounts to removing this
transactions constraint, so that each person can get that
particular coverage that suits his initial income distri-
bution best.
5. State Contingent Rates of Return
Markets for state contingent claims do not exist in
the real world. The analysis above indicates that such a
regime would have desirable properties, but an objection
to it is that it seems fairly complicated,because, in
general, it would require very many markets. Could not
the same result be achieved by a smålier number of mar-ket s?
One possible way out might be a regime of state contingent
rates of return, in which there is only one claim bought
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and sold and therefore only one market, but where the rate
of return is contingent upon which state of the world
occurs. A contract will then specify that the rate of
return will be if occurs, and if
occurs. Let x as before be the amount lent by person l
and borrowed by person 2. The market allocation will then
look as follows:
Person cl c2gl g2
1 2-x """Y' X ?-I-Y' X.-.~ -: "l" - l " ~ '~2
2 J.+x l -r 'V 4-rr-x--r c
Substituting into the utility functions it is easy
to see that the first-order conditions fo~ raximum utility
imply the following de~and/supply functions:
11(", 'Y' )_P
I ;-1:..r. 2 ~,
,lx =
2x
lO-SY' -2r-l - 2
In equilibrium we must have
that we must have
l 2x = x . This means
=
i.e.
,(8) = 33 - 2 rI'
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One characteristic of the contingent rate of return
model is clearly that it is unable to determine a unique
equilibrium of rates of return. This is hardly surprising;
we have only one market and as many rates of return as
there are states of the world. The market is only able
to determine the level of rates of return in the form of
a line in tre (r1,r;?) pi ane j no un icue poLrrt on the
line can be determined.
For the moment, let us Sidestep this problem. One
Lnt.e r-est tng que st t on is: Does t her-e exist anv equilibrium
answer: to this que st i or: is in the af'fLr-mat Lve .
To show thi~, we proceed as follows: (7. ~ -;t\,.../ I ...L.J
f'oL'lows that a Pareto opt irrur- '.eeC'_ljresa == -bl'
the paywent made by person l in the first period should
equal his payment in the second period if
IlJehave ther; that, for per-sen l
occurs.
=
With state contingent rates of return this implies that
i.e.
== -1.
It then follows from (8) that
== 9/2,
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and the amount lent by person l in the first period iS3)
x = 8/31.
The final allocation is then easily computed as
Person c c')l gl
,_ gr>
c:
l 54/31 54/31 98/31
2 AQ/AJ 39/31 Sn/31..)- ' j ...
which is exactly the same as the equ tl t br-Lnm solution
under the regime of state contingent claims. This we
know represents a Pareto optimum.
However, this is clearly a special case. Another
equilibrium solution satisfying (8) is rI = r2 = 6/5.
This is the equilibrium rate of return under the loan
market regime, and we know that the resulting allocation
is not Pareto optimal.
Since the contingent rate of return regime will
always lead to some shifting of risk, it might be reason-
able to guess that it will always perform better than the
ordinary loan market, except for the case referred to above.
But this conjecture is false. One equilibrium solution is
However, this implies x = O, .which is
3) rI = -l means a rate of interest of minus 200 per cent.
Under certainty, such a rate would be meaningless, but
not under uncertainty. The contract would read: "I pay
you ~100 this year. If you don't find oil I pay you an-
other ~100 next year; if you do, you pay me ~450."
There is nothing inherently implausible about this; indeed,
it is the case of the sleeping partner.
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the autarky solution, and which is clearly inferior to
the loan market allocation.
Geometrically (Fig.l) each equilibrium solution de-
termines a point in the U1,U2 DIane, increasing monotoni-
cally from the point (40.0, 32.5) to (40.77, 33.27). As
we have shown, the point (40.26, 32.76) is on this line.
The important point is that we cannot know whether the
contingent rate of retur~ regime will lead to a Pareto
better than thp ordinary loan market. However, if the
government or some such external authority were to fix
then the market could be left to determine
and so achieve an unconstrained Pareto optirr.urn.
But in general the number of states of the world would be
very large, say S, and in that case the government would
have to detertline (8-1) rates of return in order to be
sure that the m9,r:,:etwould realize a Pareto oot.LmaI allo-
cation. This appears to reduce the attractiveness of this
regime as an alternative to a system of state contingent
l. 4)c a.i ms ,
4) An alternative way of showing that this regime has one
equdLtbr-Lum wh.ich is Pareto optimal is the following:
We know that the state contingent claim regime results
in a Pareto optimum. Now in that case total saving of
person l is in equilibrium
4 12 8
Plzl+P2z2 = - 31 + 31 = 31 .
If state of the world Gl occurs, he will make a pay-
ment of zl = 8/31, i.e. the rate of return is minus one.
If G2 occurs, he will receive 36/31, in which case
the rate of return is 9/2. Thus, any market solution
under the state contingent claims regime imply a set of
state contingent rates of return. If these rates of
return could be established directly by the market, the
result would obviously be equivale·nt.· .
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6. Generalization
All the essential points of this paper have been
made in the preceding sections. It is obvious, however,
that the framework of the discussion has been very special.
We have assumed that there are only two consumers and two
possible states of the world in the second period. We have
further assumed that the consumers have identical utility
functions. And finally, we have assumed that this common
utility function is of a special form. All these as-
sumptions will now be relaxed.
Let there be n consumers and 3 states of the world.
Each consumer' s preferences over two-period c or.sunption
profiles can be summarized by a cardinal, concave utility
function
u.
l
= i = l, ... , n,
with first-order derivatives everywhere positive. Following
Arrow [l], we also assume that all consumers are character-
ized by risk aversion. In this context, where uncertainty
is connected with events in the second period only, this
means that 52u./5c22. < O.l l
Each consumer takes as given an income vector
== {Yli'Y2il' .~. , Y2iS}' i = l, "" n ,
where yIi is i's Lr.come in the first period, which is
known with certaint·y, and where y (s = l, S)2is ... ,
is i's income in period 2 if state of the world s occurs.
v.le also define
=
n
L: Y2is'i=l
s=l, ..., S.
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as the economy's total second-period income if state of
the world s occurs. Let be consumer i's sub-rris
jective probability that state of the world
The consumer's expected utility is then
s occurs.
(9) U.
1
=
S
7~7r. u·.(c,.,c2.),] lS l _l -ISa= _
i = 1, ... , n.
Under autarky we must have
for all i and s.
and c2· == Y2-'clS _L""
the tr~Dsfer paynents required. Let a.. be the trcmsfer
lJ
b. . the corre-1JSpaid to i fro~ j in period l,and
sporid Lng traD;3fer paymerrc in period 2 and state of the
world s. ~e then have that
n
(10 ) cli = y 1 -~ + \' a .. ,L.,...L . ..L j=l 1J
and
n
(Il) c2· = Y2is + L b .. ,lS j=l lJS
l = l, ... , n,
i == l, ... , n;
s = 1, ... , S.
Summing over i, we see that we must have
(12)
n n
L L b ..
i=l .5=1 1.J s
= 0, s = l, ... , S,
(13 )
n n
L: L
i=l j=l
a ..
l,)
= O~
We now define a Pareto optimum as the maximum of
the function
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(14) v
n
= L:
i=l
k. U.,
l l
where the k. 's are arbitrary positive constants.
l
Substituting in (9) from (10) and (Il) we can write
(15) u. =
l
S n n
L TT'. U. (Yl' + L: a .. , Y2is + L: b .. ).s=l lS l _l j=l lJ j=l lJS
Our problem is now to find the maximum of (14) subject
to (12) and (13). The first-order conditions are:
S 5u.
J_
r . ~
.is oc 1
~L J_
- A = O, j. -- l, "" n,(16) 1<.: •
J s=l
(17)
5u.
l A s = 0, i = l, ... s n;
s = l, ••. , S.
Here A and As (s = l, "'J S) are Lagrangian
muLt i.p l i er-s •
Combining (16) and (17) we can write
(18)
S fu.
l
L: TT'. Rs=l 1S ~cli
Bu.
l
TT' • -=-~-----lS OC2.lS
S 5'iu
\' ~
L.. TT'. Rs=l ,Js ,.cl·,J for all i, j, s.
In words: In a Pareto ontinum the ratio of the expected
margiral utility of present consumption to the expected
marginal utility of future consumption in state of the
world s should be equal for all consumers and all states
of the world.
NORGES HANDELSHØVSI\Ult'
BIBLIOTEKET
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We now proceed to show that a regime of state con-
tingent claims results in a Pareto optimum. Let there be
S types of claims, aDd let z. be the amount bought by i
IS
of claims of type s, i.e. claims cromising a payment of J
dollar in period 2, if and only if state of the world ~
occurs. Let n be the rrarket price of this claim. The-"s
11th consu~er's hu~get constraint is then
=
S
Yll' - L D Z. •~S ISs=l
c2·lS =
By substltution we obtain
s
(19) = ~ p (c,.._.
1 s z i s
S=J.
Each consumer now maximizes (9) subject to (19). This
yields
S fSu.
l
L: 'lT. 5 -!ls=l lS cli
= o,
15u~
.1.
'lT. '" - !lP. as c2is s
= 0, s=l, ..., S.
where !l is a Lagrangian multiplier. This implies
S 5u.
I: l'lT. 5clis=l lS l(20) = i = 1, n,au. Ps
...,
l 1, S.'lT. 5c2·
s = ...,lS lS
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But since all consumers take prices as given, we must
have that, in equilibrium
S Bu. S Su.
L: l r. _J_iT. iTjSs=l lS ,sc 5cl·(21) --li s==l .1 for all i, .j , s,= DU.s;')u.l ___,_1_iT. 'Tr.lS i'iC". JS "ic~.c:lS et) S
which are identical to conditions (19) for Pareto optimum.
Under the ordinary loan market regime the budget
constraint of the i 'th ccnsuu.er- is s LmpLy
(22 ) "IT -1- (" C \rJ2is' JIl - li) .
Maximization of (9) subject to this c~ndition yields
(23) == r, i = 1, ... , n.
This implies that
S Ru. S ~'u .
L: l M __J_iT. F L" iT. QC l •s=l IS o/Cli ~ l ss-' t..(24) -.J_ -_ .J==S Bu. S ~u .
L: ir . l L: iT. l
s=l IS ~c2iS s=l ,J s fic2 .JS
i "j = l, ..., n.
These conditions do not imply a Pareto optimum. Their
interpretation would be as follows: Under the loan
market regime the ratio of the expected marginal utility
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of present consumption to the expected marginal utility
of future consumption will be equal for all consumers.
It is immediately clear that this is much more restrictive
than the corresDonding conditions for the state contingent
claim regime. Indeed, summing over s in conditions (21)
gives (24), while (24) does not imply (21).
As in the example discussed above, we may also see
the loan market allocation as a constrained Pareto optimum.
An unconstrained Pareto optimum is found as the solution
of the following probIsn:
1° IT '.. (--
. :Ls':l\J1i
8:=-:;1
TI
.L c: b.. ).
j=l lJS
il
a .. ,b ..
l J : ,J s
sub.t ect to
Tl r
2: I: a = o~ .; .J,
i=l j=l ~.J
TI n 0, 1, S= s = .. . .I: I: b ,
j=l ,j=l jjs
This is found by rraximizing the Lagrangian expression
n n S n n
L = V - X. Z I: a. - I: X. L: I: b'j .i=l ,i=l lj s=l s i=l . l l SJ=
A constrained Pareto optlmtm is defined if we introduce
the additional S constraints
= for all s.
- 81 -
The Lagrangian then becomes
n n n n
L* = v* - ""A L: L: a. - ""A* L: L: b ..,
i=l .j=l lj i==l j""l l,v
. and the first-order maximum conditions are
S 5l1.
k. L: l ""A 0,'lTis - ==l s==l oCli
S SU.
k. ~ l !,* J,7T. -- - =
l 13 Fr.s==l '-'~2is
i = l, ... , n,
j_ -]:- ••• , (1.
It is now easy to see that, in equLL'i br-Lurc , these
cond l t t ons ~YrCnl~r (0)J.\ ':"~ tha t_..I. ..L V_lo..,) ..L ul}-i..L,/ \ c. , l » ....;;V t.d .'__• l..l the loan mar-ket does indeed
result in a constrained Pareto o pt.t mum ,
We shall not elaborate further on the contingent
rate of return regime. From the foregoing discussion it
should be fairly obvious how the analysis of section 5 can
be generalized. The essential point remains true that of
the set of possible equilihria there will in general be one
which corresponds to a Pareto optimum, but the economy will
achieve this only by a stroke of luck.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that, in general, ordinary loan markets
will not achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources.
We have also shown that such a regime will achieve a con-
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strained Pareto optimum, in the sense that second-period
interpersonal transfers are restricted to be independent
of which state of the world occurs.
Will this constraint always be effective? In other
words, can it ever happen that the ordinary loan market
ach i r;V9;:; Gt fU.ll Pnreto optLmum? Tr-~'3 only case I hav e f'ound
appears to be the exception that proves the rule. If all
consumers have identical preferences, identical probability
beliefs and essentially identical income vectors5), then
ths ordinary lonn market allocation is a Pareto optimum.
trade, and the ?clreto opt Lrnun 1;'3 simply the autarky so-
lut:.lon.
A.cornp let e system of state con t Lngerrc cLai ma seerrs
rather c00plicated, and 4~ the only practical impJ.ication
of this paDer were that such a system should be established
with all possible sneed, it couJd hardly be taken very
seriously. But the moral of the story has 2. w:Lder app lL>
cability. Suppose consumer goods could only be bought in
identical bundles. This would clearly be suboptimal as
compared with a system where consumers themselves determine
freely the composition of their consumption. Nevertheless,
if consumers were given the choice between two or thr~e
different bundles, that would clearly be an improvement,
5) The word"essentially" is explained as follows. In our
example where both persons consider the states 91 and
92 to be equally likely, the following income profiles
will be essentially identical because the probability
distributions of future income are identical.
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although the system would still be far from the optimum.
This is no less true of asset markets. In an ordinary
loan market, there is only one bundle of state contingent
claims. Introducing more types of assets means increasing
the number of different bundles of state contingent clajms.
This will be a step in the right direction because it makes
consumers better able to accomodate their time and risk
nreferences. In other words, the full optimum is apprpached
by increasing each consumer's opportunities for risk cover-
age according to his personal preferences, probability beliefs
and income profile.
itse1f is indenendent of the state of the wor-Ld. r~ore
formally, we ~ay state this as fallows: For all consumers,
c~, = c2'~ lmn12esc: l r; ._l ~~
The ranking of consurnntion
independent of the state of
the world. This seems reasonable enough for many appli-
cations, but not for all. For instance, if a person's
future income depends on whether he becomes ill or not,
the assumption is unwar-r-arit.ed, \'Ihatthis means, is that in
such a case consumption profiles alone are insufficient as
specifications of events. The utility function of the
consumer would then have to be written as, e.g.,
u,(c1" c2" a) with a = l if illness does not occur,l l l
and a = O if it does. Such a formulation would be
relevant in a disctission of loan markets from the vie~point
of health insurance.
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